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This article re-examines the theoretical basis for environmental and heritage
interpretation in tourist settings in the light of hermeneutic philosophy. It notes that the
pioneering vision of heritage interpretation formulated by Freeman Tilden envisaged a
broadly educational, ethically informed and transformative art. By contrast, current
cognitive psychological attempts to reduce interpretation to the monological
transmission of information, targeting universal but individuated cognitive structures,
are found to be wanting. Despite growing signs of diversity, this information
processing approach to interpretation remains dominant. The article then presents the
alternative paradigm of hermeneutics through the works of Schleiermacher, Dilthey,
Heidegger and Gadamer, to provide a broader interpretation of interpretation. This not
only captures the essence of Tilden’s definition but construes heritage interpretation
as a more inclusive, culturally situated, critically reflexive and dialogical practice.
Keywords: environmental interpretation; heritage tourism; hermeneutics; Gadamer;
Heidegger; Tilden
Introduction
Tourists visiting a national park or historic site will typically encounter visitor information
centres, signage, visual displays, tour guides, park rangers or curators, whose purpose is to
“interpret” the heritage values of a place or its artefacts. The question of what is actually
meant by “interpretation” in the context of environmental and heritage tourism continues
to be raised and contested. Amongst the plethora of definitions in journals and practical
manuals, the six principles of Freeman Tilden (1957/1977), outlined in his classic text,
Interpreting Our Heritage, have had an enduring influence. Increasingly, however, research-
ers and practitioners are seeking to reformulate and extend Tilden’s principles in terms of
contemporary theoretical frameworks and circumstances. Recent endeavours have made
reference to phenomenology (Knapp & Yang, 2004; Seamon, 1983, 1991), grounded
theory (Knapp & Poff, 2001), symbolic interactionism (Archer &Wearing, 2003), semiotics
(Hodge & D’souza, 1994), discourse analysis (Waterton, Smith, & Campbell, 2006), social
constructionism (Uzzell, 1998), experiential theories of place (Stewart & Kirby, 1998), criti-
cal theory (Jamal & Everett, 2004) and postcolonialism (Staiff, Bushell, & Kennedy, 2002).
The dominant framework, however, appears to be a cognitive psychological approach to
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communication theory (Ajzen, 1992; Beeton, Weiler, & Ham, 2005; Ham, 1983, 1992;
Loomis, 1996; Orams, 1995; Youngentob &Hostetler, 2003) usually characterized by infor-
mation processing models.
This article considers the possible contribution to heritage interpretation in tourist
settings of another theoretical approach, hermeneutics (the “theory of interpretation”): a
long-standing tradition of interdisciplinary inquiry concerning the nature of interpretation
in literary criticism, philosophy, philology, history and social theory (Bauman, 1992;
Crotty, 1998; Palmer, 1969). Hermeneutics covers a heterogeneous body of theory and
research that has been largely over-looked by heritage and environmental interpreters.
Exceptions to this can be found in the work of Mugerauer (1995) on the built environment,
Hooper-Greenhill (1999) on museums and Aldridge (1989) and Chen (2003) on the natural
environment, but these do not seem to have influenced the interpretation profession in any
substantial way. This may well change with what appears to be a growing literature on
“experiential approaches” that foster a “sense of place” in heritage tourism (Stewart,
Hayward, Devlin, & Kirby, 1998, p. 264; Stewart & Kirby, 1998). Hermeneutical theorists
are sometimes referred to in passing (Massey, 2005, p. 12; Tilley, 1994, p. 12) in experien-
tial studies. As Stewart and Kirby (1998, pp. 36–37) point out, however, most of these
studies tend to emphasize the uniqueness of experience and setting rather than the interpre-
tive processes which underpin these experiences of place. We propose that hermeneutics
can meet this need and provide a theoretical framework generally supportive of these
diverse accounts.
The neglect of hermeneutics is understandable given the relative absence of European
social science perspectives in the founding of heritage interpretation in the United States in
the early twentieth century and the belated translation of key hermeneutical texts into
English in the 1970s. Over the past four decades, however, hermeneutics has emerged
from relative marginality in Anglo-American scholarship to being a significant framework
for research in diverse areas such as administration and management (Kress, 1995; Mercier,
1994; Noorderhaven, 2000; Prasad, 2002), consumer research (Arnold & Fischer, 1994),
information systems (Boland, 1991; Chalmers, 2004; Myers, 1995), psychology (Martin
& Sugarman, 2001; McMillan, 1999; Messer, 1988; Packer, 1985; Rommetveit, 1991;
Widdershoven, 1999), communication studies (Arthos, 2000; Deetz, 1978; Radford, 2002;
Stewart, 1992) and tourism research (Arcodia, 2005; Tribe, 2001).
The main purpose of this article is to bring the hermeneutic tradition into conversation
with the theory and practice of heritage interpretation as formulated by Freeman Tilden and
subsequent interpreters. In Tilden’s (1977) view, heritage interpretation aimed to disclose
the significance of both natural and historico-cultural sites to contemporary visitors. This
implicitly challenges a long-standing dualism in Western thought that radically separates
nature from culture. Not all of Tilden’s successors have maintained his holistic conception,
preferring instead the narrower term of environmental interpretation, with its stronger
emphasis on the natural environment (Beckman, 1991; Ham, 1992; Lewis, 1981; Sharpe,
1976; Youngentob & Hostetler, 2003). However, Tilden’s rejection of the nature–culture
binary through adopting an inclusive notion of heritage can be coherently and productively
grounded in a hermeneutic framework, wherein nature is shown to be always already inter-
preted through cultural mediation. As we will show, this is particularly evident in the work
of Gadamer (1977, 1989), whose notion of “tradition”, as the ongoing symbolically
mediated and mediating source of meaning, provides a way of understanding both
natural and built sites (or artefacts) as cultural heritage. Consequently, heritage tourism
is understood in this article to embrace the activities of those who visit both historical
and natural sites to experience their culturally mediated significance.
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Over the past 30 years, heritage interpretation has been the subject of concerted attempts
to re-frame it in terms of the categories of cognitive psychology (Ham, 1983; Hammitt, 1981;
Prince, 1981), particularly as it pertains to communication (Ajzen, 1992; Ham, 1992, p. 3,
2002, p. 9). Much of the literature influenced by this approach assumes that the basic
meaning of “interpretation” is settled. It follows, therefore, that tour guides, rangers, curators
and other interpretive staff can move on to the more practical and technical aspects of com-
municating the heritage value of particular sites or artefact to visitors. Some scholars,
however, have raised serious doubts as to whether this provides an adequate account of
what heritage interpretation is about. David Uzzell (1998, p. 12), for example, asserts that
“interpretation is . . . stuck in a rut where the how has become more important than the
why”. More fundamentally, Uzzell (1998, p. 12) and Staiff et al. (2002, p. 98) express con-
cerns about the epistemological grounds and “content” of interpretation, especially its
emphasis on an objectivist,Western scientific paradigm (which underpins cognitivemodels).
Hermeneutics by contrast, particularly the work of Heidegger and Gadamer, disputes
the monopolistic claims to truth of scientific objectivism by questioning the universal appli-
cability of its subject–object dualism to all forms of understanding. While hermeneutics is
not a refutation of the findings of cognitive psychology, its differing perspective allows for a
reconsideration of the latter’s problematic assumptions and their consequences in interpre-
tive practice. In particular, we suggest that a predominantly cognitivist approach risks redu-
cing Tilden’s rich and transformative conception of interpretation to the unilateral
presentation of “information”, which Tilden explicitly sought to avoid. Consequently, it is
argued that hermeneutics can provide a framework for recapturing and extending Tilden’s
broader vision of interpretation. This broader formulation also questions the current asym-
metry in the interpreter–visitor relationship; pointing towards a more inclusive, culturally
situated, critically reflexive and dialogical model of heritage interpretation.
The discussion firstly outlines the genealogy of heritage interpretation and the increas-
ing influence of cognitive psychological models and assumptions from the late 1970s
onwards. It then elucidates some of the main insights and principles of hermeneutics.
The latter is explicated by highlighting four seminal thinkers, Schleiermacher, Dilthey,
Heidegger and Gadamer, who are broadly representative (but by no means exhaustive)
of the diverse hermeneutic tradition (Palmer, 1969). In this selection a distinction is
made between the “traditional hermeneutics” of Schleiermacher and Dilthey, with their
focus on epistemological issues, and the “philosophical hermeneutics” of Heidegger and
Gadamer, with their ontological concerns about the nature of the interpreter and interpretive
community (Guignon, 2002, p. 265). Both of these perspectives are then employed to
address current concerns in heritage interpretation. Against its critics, we also demonstrate
that philosophical hermeneutics provides the basis for both a pluralistic (Guignon, 2002,
p. 266) and critical (Prasad, 2002, p. 23) approach to interpretation. That is, it allows for
a multiplicity of truthful interpretations but nevertheless critically evaluates all such
accounts in a model of continuous dialogue that refuses subjectivist relativism.
Hermeneutics is a “broad church”, and were a comprehensive account possible it would
also include a discussion of the distinct but interrelated perspectives of Habermas’s (1987)
critical theory, Foucault’s “interpretive analytics” (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983), Derrida’s
“radical hermeneutics” of deconstruction (Caputo & Martinez, 1997) and Ricoeur’s
(1974) hermeneutics of suspicion and retrieval. We do not have space to do these other
critical perspectives justice but would encourage others to draw upon them in enriching
heritage interpretation. Indeed, as we have indicated this process of diversification has
already begun. We simply aim to clarify the advantages of some of the key insights of
the hermeneutic tradition for contemporary heritage interpretation. Accordingly, the
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main insights of the four selected thinkers are related back to Tilden’s principles of
interpretation with a view to rehabilitating and re-working some of the latter’s neglected
dimensions. In effect this points beyond Tilden to the wider discussions about interpret-
ation taking place in other disciplines but consistent with Tilden’s basic intention of
establishing heritage interpretation as a broadly educational, ethically informed and trans-
formative art. In short, this article revisits the epistemological and ontological bases for
heritage interpretation with a view to broadening its theoretical framework in the
“holistic” (Archer & Wearing, 2003, p. 6; Wearing, Archer, & Jackson, 2003), “experien-
tial” (Stewart & Kirby, 1998, p. 36) and “critical” (Uzzell, 1998, p. 16) directions that a
number of interpretive researchers have advocated.
Heritage interpretation: a genealogy
The modern practices of heritage tourism interpretation originate from the early con-
servation movement that began in the United States in the nineteenth century. Its initial
inspiration and concerns are reflected in the nature writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson
(1803–1882), Henry Thoreau (1817–1862) and John Muir (1838–1914), which influ-
enced the “nature study” movement in American education. A disciple of Muir’s, Enos
Mills (1870–1922) is credited as the first environmental interpreter (Brochu & Merriman,
2002a; Civitarese, Legg, & Zueffle, 1997; Fazio, 1975). Mills published the first book on
nature guiding and campaigned widely to establish the National Park Service in the United
States. His writings stress the need for direct immersion of the visitor in the natural environ-
ment to awaken a sense of wonderment; leading to deeper understanding. The aim of nature
guiding was “to illuminate and reveal the alluring world outdoors” (Mills, 1920, p. 130).
Clearly what Mills had in mind was an art rather than a science, interpretation rather
than analysis. It was an outdoors alternative to what Mills deemed the “bookish” traditions
of formal learning in schools and museums. Part of the guide’s role was to be inter alia “an
interpreter of [the sciences of] geology, botany, zoology and natural history” (Mills, 1920,
p. 130) but in a way that formed a compelling narrative about the visitor’s environment; that
“. . . appeals to the imagination and reason, gives flesh and blood to cold facts, makes life
stories of inanimate objects” (Mills, 1920, p. 126).
As Brochu and Merriman (2002a: 12) point out, the principle that interpretation is
not simply information, the recitation of facts, is preserved in Freeman Tilden’s
(1884–1980) highly influential text Interpreting Our Heritage (1957/1977). In Tilden’s
oft-cited definition, interpretation is
an educational activity which aims to reveal meanings and relationships through the use
of original objects, by firsthand experience, and by illustrative media rather than simply to
communicate factual information. Interpretation is revelation of a larger truth that lies
behind any statement of fact. (Tilden, 1977, p. 8)
Tilden (1977, p. 9) expands this preliminary definition by elaborating six principles
of environmental interpretation. These hold that interpretation (1) must relate what is
displayed to the experience of the visitor; (2) is revelation rather than information; (3) is
a teachable art; (4) provokes rather than instructs; (5) relates parts to an underlying
whole and that (6) children will need a qualitatively different interpretive approach from
adults. These principles were never posited as immutable laws or methods yet it is a testa-
ment to Tilden’s erudition that they remain fundamental in interpretive program manuals
and texts (Brochu & Merriman, 2002b; Ham, 1992; Pond, 1993; Sharpe, 1976).
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As already noted, Tilden also expanded the referents for interpretation to include both
the natural and built environments within his broad notion of heritage. More than this,
Tilden’s view of interpretation is inseparable from an ethically informed conservation
practice, encapsulated in the dictum: “through interpretation, understanding; through under-
standing, appreciation; through appreciation, protection” (Tilden, 1977, p. 38). In Tilden’s
view, interpretation is not simply about cognition but is a fundamentally transformative
praxis in which visitors come to re-experience nature or history in a holistic manner.
At its most ambitious, the interpretive experience leads the heritage visitor towards a
new relationship with nature or history. The ethic which drives interpretation according
to Tilden (1977, p. 90) is “love” in the sense of care for the thing interpreted and the
people who come to experience it. As will be demonstrated shortly, this view is more
consonant with contemporary hermeneutics than a cognitive, information processing
model. Such affinity is not surprising given that Tilden was heavily influenced by
Emerson’s Transcendentalist philosophy, which has its roots (via English Romanticism)
in the same German Idealist philosophy that gave rise to hermeneutics (Mitchell, 2005).
However, in upholding the extra-cognitive dimensions of interpretation, modern hermeneu-
tics also provides a counter-weight to purely arbitrary subjectivism.
Over the past half-century, with the growth of urbanization, the tourist industry, national
parks and heritage sites, the need for conserving, managing and communicating environ-
mental values has led to various attempts to reformulate and expand on Tilden’s interpretive
principles. Some, like the pioneer of British Interpretation, Don Aldridge (1972, pp. 307–
308, 1989, p. 65), have stressed that interpretation is the art of explaining the conservation
values of a place to the public, without prescribing what they should think. Both Aldridge
(1989) and Uzzell (1998) also emphasize the potential of heritage interpretation to “present
alternative scenarios for the future direction of society” (Uzzell, 1998, p. 16), challenging
people to think about the sort of world in which they wish to live. In this view interpretation
is a critical educational practice based on care for the environment (Stewart et al., 1998,
p. 264), in which the visitor’s agency and potential wisdom are respected. This broad, artis-
tic, value-driven and transformative vision is extended by interpretive scholars like Beck
and Cable (2002) who attribute the qualities of revelation, “gift” and “hope” to environ-
mental and heritage interpretation.
On the other hand, with the institutionalization and commodification of National Parks as
tourist sites, the potential of interpretation as a “management tool” for controlling visitor
behaviour has also been advocated (Beckman, 1988, p. 14; Field & Wagar, 1973; Ham,
2002; Hooper & Weiss, 1991; Sharpe, 1976), and the instrumental or technical means for
getting an environmental message across have been increasingly emphasized. In this
context, interpretation comes to be viewed as something that managers plan and present to
people, rather than something that people might actively make for themselves or with others
(Uzzell, 1998, p. 18). Unfortunately, in this sort ofmanagerial or guide-centredmodel, visitors
come to be seen as relatively passive. Such institutional practices favour the use ofmonosemic
and instrumental types of interpretive theory, including those provided by marketing, consu-
mer research and cognitive psychology, and an exclusive emphasis on these risks engendering
manipulation rather than understanding (Archer & Wearing, 2003, p. 6; Uzzell, 1998, p. 17).
Cognitive psychology and information processing in heritage interpretation
Since the 1970s, there have been highly successful attempts to ground heritage interpretation
within a predominantly scientific theoretical framework derived primarily from cognitive
psychology (DART, 1978; Ham, 1983; Hammitt, 1981, 1984; Kaplan, 1978), particularly
Current Issues in Tourism 213
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as it pertains to communication studies (Ajzen, 1992; Borun &Massey, 1990; Dick, McKee,
& Wagar, 1974; Fazio & Gilbert, 2000; Ham, 1992, 2002; Jacobson, McDuff, & Monroe,
2006; Jensen, 2006; Kuo, 2002; Lackey, 2002; Lackey & Ham, 2003; Littlefair, 2003;
Loomis, 1996; Prince, 1981; Roggenbuck, 1992; Sanders, 1987; Wechtunyagul, 2007;
Youngentob & Hostetler, 2003). Cognitive-inspired studies appear to have been introduced
initially as part of a move to “evaluate” the effectiveness of interpretation programs for
resource management purposes (McCool & Stankey, 2003; Stewart & Kirby, 1998,
p. 33). However, as the categories employed by evaluative researchers were “fed back”
into interpretive programs and planning, the theory and practice of interpretation have
been re-shaped accordingly (Ham, 1983, 1992; Hammitt, 1981, 1984; Prince, 1981). Promi-
nent strands of cognitive psychological theory applied to interpretation in tourist settings
include cognitive map theory (DART, 1978; Hammitt, 1981; Kaplan, 1978; Knopf, 1981;
Orams, 1995), cognitive dissonance theory (Orams, 1995), the elaboration likelihood
model of communication (Lackey, 2002; Petty, McMichael, & Brennon, 1992), the
theory of reasoned action (Bright, Manfredo, Fishbein, & Bath, 1993; Ham & Krumpe,
1996; Manfredo & Bright, 1991), the theory of persuasive communication (Roggenbuck
& Berrier, 1982) and the theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen, 1992; Beeton et al., 2005;
Hendricks, 2000; Jensen, 2006; Roggenbuck, 1992).
Cognitive psychology addresses the way humans obtain, retain and process information
(Ham, 1983, p. 12) as discrete and representable units of meaning. In keeping with earlier
behaviourism it assumes that human individuals act in response to external stimuli but
posits that these responses are mediated through cognitive models: mental constructs,
representations or beliefs systems of the mind, which may be conscious or unconscious
(Widdershoven, 1999). The locus of meaning in this approach resides in each individual’s
mental constructs which are deemed to correspond with objects, whose representatives they
are “within the mind” (Phillips, 1999, p. 259). This approach, therefore, tends to restrict
interpretation to the operations of individual cognition.
According to Radford (1994), psychology, in both its behaviourist and cognitivist
versions, has dominated communication studies since its inception. The dominant frame-
work originated in Shannon and Weaver’s (1949, pp. 33–34) cybernetic theory of com-
munication, which psychologists took up in the 1950s. This model delineates the ways
in which a message or meanings are transmitted, from a sender (transmitter) via a medium
to a receiver in a unilateral fashion (Ajzen, 1992; Ham, 2002; Lackey, 2002; Lackey &
Ham, 2003; Manfredo & Bright, 1991; Morgan & Welton, 1994; Prince, 1981). When
communication is reduced in this fashion to cognitive information processing, then defining
interpretation as a sub-set, “method” or “approach to communication” (Ham, 1992, p. 3,
2002, p. 9) preserves this reductionism in subsequent analyses.
The applications of information processing models in heritage interpretation typically
involve measuring the extent to which a message is effectively lodged in the mind of the
recipients and its persuasiveness with regard to behavioural outcomes (Ajzen, 1992;
Armstrong & Weiler, 2003; Beeton et al., 2005; Cable, Knudson, Udd, & Stewart, 1987;
Kool, 1986; Youngentob & Hostetler, 2003). While there has been acknowledgement in
more recent studies on the way that receivers “elaborate” upon the meanings received
(notably Ajzen, 1992), the emphasis is still on bringing the visitors’ beliefs and behaviour
into accord with the site management’s view with maximum efficiency before an interpret-
ation can be regarded as “successful” (Armstrong &Weiler, 2003; Beeton et al., 2005; Ham,
2004; Hendricks, 2000; Roggenbuck, 1992; Youngentob & Hostetler, 2003).
Cognitive models of information processing (focusing upon sender–message/
medium–receiver–elaboration and/or feedback) underpin much research, training and
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evaluation carried out by academics working in the field of heritage and environmental
interpretation, but it is debatable whether all interpretive practitioners consciously or pri-
marily subscribe to these. The situation on the ground is undoubtedly more eclectic and
multi-faceted. Nevertheless, the model’s assumptions emphasizing the effectiveness of
message retention and obtaining behavioural compliance remain pervasive regardless of
whether it is explicitly utilized or not (e.g., Bitgood, 2000; Borun & Miller, 1980;
Bright, 1994; Cole, Hammond, & McCool, 1997; Hooper-Greenhill, 1994; Kool, 1986).
In recent times, the orthodox cognitivist paradigm in heritage interpretation has been
challenged from within psychology by those (notably Uzzell, 1998) committed to social con-
structionist and socio-cultural approaches. As Stewart and Kirby (1998, p. 36) have noted
there has also been a promising shift towards what they characterized as “experiential”
approaches to heritage interpretation, involving recognition of the mutli-sensory, affective,
kinesthetic and actively “mindful” (as distinct from cognitive) dimensions of interpretation
(e.g., Moscardo, 1999, pp. 75–78). This has led to a greater appreciation of the subjective
processes involved in the visitors making meanings for themselves, particularly in the work
of McIntosh and Prentice (1999). However, the significant theoretical implications of these
innovative studies do not appear to have been fully appreciated as yet by the profession or
those researchers committed to the dominant cognitive psychological model. Furthermore,
these accounts while providing a much more satisfactory account of the tourist’s interpretive
agency do not yet sufficiently address the interplay of agency and culture. It may be that
hermeneutics provides the possibility of a multi-perspectival and multi-disciplinary holistic
framework to underpin these newer approaches.
In the preceding critique, there is no question that cognitive psychology demonstrates
valid findings; however, the portrayal of interpretation as a function of information proces-
sing by individuals is unnecessarily reductionist and instrumental in heritage tourist
contexts. It takes a special case of communicative interaction and treats it as the whole
in the service of agency-centred managerial practices. Further, cognitive psychology
makes assumptions about the nature of communication, meaning and human reality that
are questionable from a hermeneutic standpoint.
The hermeneutic tradition: major thinkers and insights
The word hermeneutics derives from the ancient Greek herme´neuein, which means
“to interpret” or “to understand”. It has the same root as the name of the Greek God
Hermes, the messenger of divine truth to the limited comprehension of mortals. In classical
philosophy it refers variously to the expressing, explaining and translation of meaning, to
making the unfamiliar familiar or intelligible (Palmer, 1969, pp. 12–14). Modern herme-
neutics grew out of the interpretation of texts, particularly religious texts (Crotty, 1998,
pp. 87–88). However since the German Enlightenment, it has been extended to all
spheres of human enquiry whereby meaning is seen not as something to be calculated
and represented but rather as something to be explicated and extended.
The first of the four thinkers to be considered here is Friedrich Schleiermacher
(1768–1834), a philosopher and theologian, involved in debates about the methodology
of philological, juridical and biblical interpretation. Credited with being the first modern
philosopher to propose a general theory of interpretation, Schleiermacher (1838/1998,
p. 3) defined hermeneutics as “the art of understanding”, with a particular emphasis on
understanding “the . . . discourse of another person correctly”. While concerned with
textual analysis, his principles can be generalized to other areas of human knowledge.
Unlike some previous interpreters, Schleiermacher did not believe that the meanings
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of things we encounter in the world are self-evident. On the contrary, texts and objects
require an active effort on the part of an interpreter to recover or “make sense” of their
meaning and worth. Interpretation is not simply a matter of conveying an already transpar-
ent understanding to where there is none but also of unraveling misunderstanding, rectify-
ing error and actively constituting a coherent meaning. Studying the meaning of a text, for
example, requires giving weight to both the “objective” rules of grammar and the most
likely “subjective” meanings of the original author in their historical context. Given that
these procedures involve the interplay of both objective and subjective assessments,
Schleiermacher claimed interpretation is necessarily an art and not a science. This artistic
quality of interpretation, however, which Tilden (1977, p. 9) also advocates in his third
principle of interpretation, does not preclude rigour or the application of teachable
principles.
The basic interpretive principle for Schleiermacher was that any particular thing we
may wish to understand “can only be understood from out of the whole” (Schleiermacher,
1998, p. 27) of which it forms a part. This leads him to posit the circular character of human
understanding: “knowledge is always in an apparent circle, that each particular can only be
understood via the general”. In turn, “the understanding of the whole is . . . conditioned by
that of the particular” (Schleiermacher, 1998, p. 231). This principle, known as the “herme-
neutic circle”, formulated in the early 1800s is reiterated in the fifth of Tilden’s six prin-
ciples: “interpretation should aim to present the whole rather than a part. . .” (Tilden,
1977, p. 9). Taking an example from botany, the isolated leaves of a tree would hold
limited botanical meaning without knowledge of their important role (photosynthesis and
cellular respiration) for the whole plant of which they form a part. The tree, in turn,
becomes more meaningful within a forest habitat or wider ecosystem that includes
human beings.
Schleiermacher (1998, p. 5) also makes an important distinction between interpretation,
which aims to understand the meaning of something (hermeneutical understanding), and
communication or rhetoric, which aims to present that understanding to others in a persua-
sive manner. Interestingly, Schleiermacher’s idea of communication (in so far as he deals
with communication and not interpretation) is similar to contemporary cognitive-based the-
ories of communication. It relies on the successful, unilateral presentation of one’s ideas to
another person or group through an effective communicative medium, such as a speech or
text. This also emphasizes the authority of the author or “sender” rather than the “receiver”
in establishing meaning (Rundell, 1998). It presupposes a largely monological form of
communication, such as one finds in advertising and public relations, where the meaning
is controlled to produce a particular outcome rather than relying on the interpretive capacity
of the audience or any interaction with the sender. This entails an asymmetric power relation
in which the receiver is expected to bring themselves into conformity with the sender’s
authoritative message. Given that Schleiermacher was concerned with Biblical and juridical
interpretation in an authoritarian Protestant society, his emphasis on the authority of the
author/sender is understandable. Whether this is desirable or even effective in a contempor-
ary tourist context is a question that interpreters need to take seriously when developing
programs.
Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911), the second of the thinkers considered, was a nineteenth-
century psychologist and historian who wanted to turn Schleiermacher’s art of interpret-
ation into a science. He believed interpretation was essential not only for understanding
texts but for understanding the human world in general. Consequently, Dilthey (1976)
expanded Schleiermacher’s application of the “hermeneutic circle” to incorporate the
broadest historical and cultural contexts. Interpretation for Dilthey was the process
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of questioning the meaning of the thing to be interpreted (e.g., a tree, forest, historic site,
rare species or artefact) in relation to its broader contexts (e.g., history, world or
environment).
An example of Dilthey’s circular conceptualization of interpretation, relevant to
environmental interpreters, can be illustrated by how we might go about understanding a
tree. This can be done in a range of contexts. For example, we could begin by asking
about the tree’s biological or botanical classification. This involves moving conceptually
away from that particular tree to the wider body of arboreal knowledge which forms part
of the context of both the tree and the interpreter. It might be identified as Eucalyptus
Papuana Aperrerinja (Brooker, 2000), commonly known as a “ghost gum”. This term,
derived from a broader classificatory system, gives the interpreter information to expand
both their own and their audiences’ understanding of the particular tree in question.
Another context in relation to this particular tree might be historical, or even political. It
may be that this tree was the heritage-listed “Tree of Knowledge” at Barcaldine in Queens-
land under which 3000 defeated strikers were said to have gathered in 1891 to form the
Australian Labour Party. This tree made headlines in May 2006 when it was poisoned
by vandals on the occasion of the passing of new industrial relations laws by a then con-
servative Australian Government, restricting the activities of trade unions and collective
bargaining rights (Lagan, 2006). In both instances, interpretation is effected by referring
the particular to a more general context and then relating this back to the particular.
The process of interpretation outlined by Dilthey can be seen to operate on two levels
(Lee Martin, 2002; Rundell, 1998). First is the level of mutually shared knowledge that
most adults within a society already hold about things through a common language, such
as the knowledge to name trees, rocks, people, places, etc. Dilthey calls this common
stock of descriptive knowledge (facts), elementary understanding. It is only by raising
questions about gaps, possible connections or contradictions in our elementary understand-
ing that we move to the second level of interpretive understanding by traversing the herme-
neutic circle (Rundell, 1998). Dilthey’s distinction of levels is analogous to that found
between factual “information” and interpretation in Tilden’s (1977, pp. 9, 18–25) second
principle. Interpretation for Tilden always “includes information”, but much like Dilthey’s
elementary understanding, this is only a preliminary step towards interpretation. In both
cases, the point of interpretation is the “revelation of a larger truth that lies behind any
statement of fact” (Tilden, 1977, p. 8). This search for the larger truth is essentially a her-
meneutical exercise, in which the interpreter moves constantly from the interpreted to its
broader contexts and back again. In this sense, any interpretation is always ongoing, incom-
plete and “partial”. There are always more questions that can be asked of any site or
experience.
While Schleiermacher and Dilthey envisaged interpretation as a methodology for the
humanities, later hermeneutic philosophers such as Heidegger (1962) and Gadamer
(1989) rethink interpretation as underpinning all forms of understanding, including
natural science. That is, they see interpretation as ontological, as fundamental to being
human. Science, methodologies and research techniques are conceived as arising upon
this “primordial” capacity to interpret. By starting with our interpretive capacity rather
than its referents, these philosophers also undercut the nature–culture binary referred to
above, which can unnecessarily limit and distort our understanding of heritage.
The philosopher Martin Heidegger (1889–1976), proposed that “interpretation is never
a presuppositionless apprehending of something” (Heidegger, 1962, pp. 191–192).
The world (both natural and cultural) is always already pre-interpreted as we reflect upon
it. Through being socialized in a particular culture and language, we already have a
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“fore-structure” of innumerable background understandings, practical dispositions, habits
and tacit skills for recognizing and negotiating the things we encounter in everyday life
(Heidegger, 1962, p. 191). Consequently, we normally experience things, whether
natural or cultural things, as “something” and rather than “nothing” (Heidegger, 1962,
p. 189). We do not normally need to analyze the separate properties of things we encounter
in daily life to understand them. We do not, for example, piece together the separate prop-
erties of “green”, “leafy”, “tall”, “wooden trunk” and conclude “Ah ha, it must be a tree!”
Recognition, based on a multitude of prior experiences with trees, is instantaneous. The
various meanings we give to things, such as trees, will reflect our past experiences, expec-
tations and the place accorded to those things in our culture and its practices. This is how
the hermeneutic circle is extended by Heidegger to everyday life, orbiting between the
particular thing we may wish to interpret and the myriad of background social practices,
habits, routines and experiences. Theoretical or scientific thought also emerges out of
this background but is not our most common mode of thinking, nor is it necessarily the
best for dealing with the problems of life.
According to Heidegger, scientific rationality is powerful but entails metaphysical
assumptions that are potentially distorting. Foremost amongst these is subject/object
dualism (Heidegger, 1962, p. 87, 1984, p. 132). This is the idea that we humans go
about all inquiry as rational, knowing “subjects”, confronting the world as a set of separate
“objects” that are not part of our subjectivity (consciousness). In short, for the purposes
of scientific or theoretical understanding we pretend that we are world-less beings or
beings without a context. Furthermore, the world (as objects) confronts us initially as
something unknown but nevertheless available for our inspection and potential manipu-
lation. Heidegger wants us to see through the contrivances of this view and consider objec-
tive rationality as a derivative and intermittent special purpose form of knowledge.
Following Heidegger, Jurgen Habermas (1987) has argued that we only need this
analytical-empirical type of knowledge in relation to matters requiring technical control.
It follows that we must be extremely careful of its application to questions of meaning
and values, including the meaning and worth of our natural environment and cultural heri-
tage. While scientific knowledge explains causal relationships or correlations, it cannot of
itself make value judgements or give ultimate meaning to our lives in the universe. The
latter requires other forms of understanding. There are, for Heidegger, other forms of
“truth” besides scientific truth that have a valid role in interpretation.
Heidegger (1977) wants us to de-centre the over-privileged and, thus, lop-sided position
we have given scientific (particularly “technological”) rationality in our Western culture.
This is not because rationality is wrong but because the exclusivity attached to its truth-
claims as “the only valid form” of knowledge can seriously distort our understanding of
the world. Heidegger wants us to recall other important ways of understanding and experi-
encing the world that stem from the fact that we are already “in the world” prior to our
conceptual understanding of things. Truth, for Heidegger, is not simply the correspondence
between statements and objects (as in analytical-empirical epistemology), or the correspon-
dence between internal mental constructs and an external environment (as in cognitive
psychology) (Phillips, 1999). Rather, truth is an experience or process that involves uncon-
cealing what was previously concealed. It is, in short, revelation (entbergen). Science is also
a mode of revelation but presupposes other more fundamental layers of meaning attributed
to things or places, including our pre- or sub-cognitive practical understandings. Indeed,
Heidegger says that it is these implicit and shared background practices that make things
intelligible and available to science for empirical testing in the first place (Heidegger,
1962, p. 122). Interpretation therefore involves placing what we wish to interpret in the
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context of these shared background understandings to reveal connections that had pre-
viously been hidden or forgotten. Tilden (1977, pp. 9, 18) makes this same point in his
second and fourth principles respectively when he says, “interpretation is revelation” and
“interpretation is not instruction, but provocation”.
Heidegger further suggests that we reveal other kinds of truth through art (Heidegger,
1971, pp. 36, 56–56, 67–72), meditative thought (Heidegger, 1971, p. 181), moral reflec-
tion (Heidegger, 1962, pp. 344–346) and attentiveness to moods and feelings or what today
might be called “emotional intelligence”. This accords with Tilden’s advice in his fifth prin-
ciple that interpretation must address “the whole man [or woman] rather than any phase”.
The recent psychological work on “affect” in heritage interpretation (Orams, 1995; Webb,
2000) promises a broadening of older cognitive framework and may partially confirm
Heidegger. However, attempting to explain affective experiences in terms of an individual’s
“mental” structures (if not a contradiction in terms) offers no self-evident advantage as a
basis for interpretation over the dynamic involvement of one’s whole being (mind, body
and emotions) in shared cultural practices. Living in a world of multiple contexts and
change, the human way of being in the light of Heidegger appears multi-layered and
dynamic in its interpretive possibilities.
Another mode of interpretation for Heidegger (1977, p. 12) that enables us to relate,
reveal and provoke significant truths about our environment but resists all logical
closure, measurement or control is the poetic (including poetry, lyric narrative and song).
This is remarkably consistent with Tilden (1977, p. 27), who says the “interpreter must
use art, and at best he [or she] will be somewhat of a poet”. Poetry, for Heidegger (1977,
pp. 3–35; 2000), is a way of letting language reveal to us the possibilities of all sorts of
tacitly understood things and their connections. Consider the following poem, Municipal
Tree, by one of Australia’s great Indigenous poets, Oodgeroo Noonuccal (1990), and the
sorts of truth it may reveal.
Municipal Gum1
Gumtree in the city street,
Hard bitumen around your feet,
Rather you should be
In the cool world of leafy forest halls
And wild bird calls
Here you seems to me
Like that poor cart-horse
Castrated, broken, a thing wronged,
Strapped and buckled, its hell prolonged,
Whose hung head and listless mien express
Its hopelessness.
Municipal gum, it is dolorous
To see you thus
Set in your black grass of bitumen—
O fellow citizen,
What have they done to us?
The truth of this poem is not objective but neither is it purely subjective; rather it resides in
its provocation to make something significant out of a range of possible meanings that
culture makes available. Heidegger (2000) reminds us that the truth of poetic interpretation
1Reproduced by permission of John Wiley & Sons.
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is not found in factual correctness but its capacity for revelation in particular contexts. The
gum tree here, is a thing out of place “in the city street” and “a thing wronged”. In another
time and place (perhaps the creation dreaming of Noonuccal’s people) and certainly prior
to European colonization, it would have stood strong and potent (not “castrated”) in “the
cool world of leafy forest halls”. One may be tempted to see a metaphoric parallel here
between the fate of this tree and that of Noonuccal’s people. The current political
context will invariably intrude on most Australian readings of this poem and what it has
to say about non-Indigenous society’s mis-treatment of nature and Indigenous people.
Despite brevity, the associations and emotional resonances of word, rhyme and image
are too numerous to list here. Poetry, like art, speaks expansively to a different level of
being than the purely cognitive, especially in those cultures that value the poetic in daily
life (Gordon, 2000).
Heidegger’s arguments about the diverse interpretive capacities of human beings have
much to offer for heritage interpreters. They point to the importance of valuing other ways
of understanding or experiencing truth that are more basic or “primal” than scientific expla-
nation (and not simply as embellishment or technique). Tilden (1977, pp. 9, 47–54) was
particularly aware in formulating his sixth principle that children, who have not yet devel-
oped abstract analytical skills, need to be addressed by qualitatively different educational
programs than those offered to adults. Interpreters, therefore, need to be mindful of the rev-
elatory, truth-disclosing capacities in myth, folklore, narrative, art, poetry and play in
addition to science. While interpretive centres may not be suitable for poetry readings,
many have utilized story telling (Pastorelli, 2004) and even theatrical performance
(Dierking, 1998, p. 62) for both children and adults as part of their interpretive programs.
American environmental educator, Susan Strauss in The Passionate Fact (1996) provides
an exemplary account of how story telling as an interactive, literary, visual and auditory
experience speaks powerfully to both the “head” and “heart” in her on-site performances.
The revival of nature writing as a popular genre (both in fiction and non-fiction) also attests
to the different forms of engagement the public is seeking with the natural environment and
cultural heritage (Sharp, 2005, p. 358). It may be our greatest mistake to think of inter-
pretation, primarily as a cognitive event (Heidegger, 1971, p. 112).
The final thinker dealt with here is Heidegger’s student Hans George Gadamer (1900–
2003), who extends the former’s insights about how our pre-understandings of shared back-
ground practices (rather than mental maps) facilitate interpretation with his notions of
“cultural tradition”, “prejudice” and communication as conversation leading to a “fusion
of horizons”.
Gadamer’s work demonstrates the unavoidably social character of the interpretive
circle. Not in the sense that we never cogitate alone but rather that all interpretation
takes place within an ongoing history, language and inter-subjective context: what
Gadamer calls a cultural “tradition”. We all inhabit such traditions and are inhabited by
them (Gadamer, 1989, p. 358). In this view, nature and natural objects are not things we
encounter apart from, or prior to, culture. These too are mediated through cultural traditions,
which we explicate and transform through language in our ongoing social interactions, nar-
ratives and conversations as heritage. The source of meaning, therefore, in any heritage
interpretation resides primarily in cultural traditions and their transformation; not the indi-
vidual’s head. If tradition is the source of meaning it also follows that meaning cannot be
“inherent in” the object of interpretation, contrary to the American National Association for
Interpretation’s (2000) and National Park Service’s (2003) definition of interpretation. This
is why the “same” artefact or site can have very different meanings to different groups of
people.
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The primacy of cultural tradition in providing meaning is evident in the way many
North Americans identify the opposite of the urban environment with “the wilderness”
(Mugerauer, 1995; Zimmerman, 1992), whereas a Briton may talk about “the countryside”
(Aldridge, 1975; Grace, 1996), a non-Indigenous Australian may refer to “the bush” or
“outback” (Seddon, 1997; Sharp, 2005) and an Indigenous Australian to “country”
(Zeppel, Muloin, & Higginbottom, 2003). These terms, wilderness, countryside, bush
and country, are neither transparent descriptions nor (despite some similarities) synonyms.
Each term signifies a “sense of place” within the preconceived meanings and practices of
ever changing and interweaving traditions. Such traditions do not have to be “national”,
homogenous, static or mutually exclusive, for Gadamer (1990, p. 288), but they are what
connect people and places; making both intelligible across time. While people share tra-
ditions, no single understanding contains all aspects of a tradition. We all have a limited
“horizon of understanding” or “range of vision . . . from a particular vantage point”
(Gadamer, 1989, p. 143).
In Gadamer’s view, language and tradition “pre-form” our experience of places and
things before we ever encounter a professional interpreter. Thus, when Tilden (1977,
pp. 9, 11–17) advises in his first principle that interpretation must “relate what is being dis-
played or described to something within the personality or experience of the visitor”,
interpreters need to be mindful of the social dimensions of that experience. That is, how
personal experience has already been shaped by language and socio-historical tradition.
Another word for the unexamined preconceptions of tradition, which have shaped past
experience and through which we tend to read new experiences of our environment, is
“prejudice”. Gadamer, however, does not accept the traditionally negative view of prejudice
as necessarily hindering understanding. Prejudices can be distorting but they can also
provide a vantage point enabling our understanding (Gadamer, 1989, p. 143). Such prejudg-
ments or pre-understandings are the starting point of any interpretation because they
provide the means for us to identify and question the things we encounter. When we
encounter something we do not understand, our preconceptions are challenged to change
in order that we might understand (Arnold & Fischer, 1994, p. 57).
All visitors will bring prejudices to a heritage site. In visiting a forest, a timber-worker
or builder may see the trees primarily as an untapped resource. An environmental scientist
may see the same trees as vital components of regional bio-diversity in need of conserva-
tion. A recreational tourist may experience trees mainly for their aesthetic value or feel that
they provide an environment in which to relax and recuperate from a stressful life-style. For
the Indigenous Australian visitor, partaking in a non-Western tradition, the trees may be
sacred or part of the story of that country, with a spiritual significance that may elude
non-Indigenous understandings. These divergent attitudes to the natural environment can
cause or reflect conflict in the wider society. In the context of a heritage site, however,
there emerges the possibility for a dialogue or conversation across differing positions
and reflection upon one’s own position. This in turn may lead to a change that attempts
to address or overcome the conflicts and disparities of power in the wider society
(Packer & Goicoechea, 2000). The recognition of Indigenous land ownership that has
occurred at Uluru (formerly Ayers Rock) and Kakadu National Parks (De Lacy, 1994;
Weaver, 1991) in Australia, where many Indigenous inhabitants now conduct interpret-
ation, fosters and perhaps anticipates further developments in this regard. Dialogue facili-
tates but cannot guarantee positive changes in the relations between different peoples and
places.
Interpretation, for Gadamer (1989, p. 362), commences with the raising of questions
about the thing to be interpreted. It proceeds by way of communication as it does for
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cognitive psychology but communication is modelled on conversation and not the unilateral
transmission of a message. In communication as conversation or dialogue, the roles of
“sender” and “receiver” become fluid and reciprocal. There will be an exchange of precon-
ceptions, signs and stories. This will only happen, of course, if both parties are prepared to
listen and understand a horizon that is not theirs (Gadamer, 1989, p. 347). This means par-
ticipants allowing their ideas and feelings about something to be put to the test, allowing
others to read and question them in the light of their experience and contexts. In a
genuine dialogue we also have to be prepared to admit that another understanding may
be right and that our own has to change. We in turn will question the other’s understandings
from our horizon and they may shift their understanding as a result. No participant holds all
the wisdom in a conversation, although some may have more information at their disposal
than others. The understanding reached through dialogue is not one of imposed agreement
but conviction arising from the to-and-fro interplay of participant’s contributions. Ideally,
dialogue opens up the possibility of ongoing learning, mutual correction and change.
Interpretation, therefore, is a function of communication as conversation and the
traditions within, against and between which conversation takes place. In dialogue,
we communicate not only with those who may be physically present but we also mobilize
the preconceptions of cultural traditions about a site or artefact and bring them to bear on
present questions. In this cross-over of present and past conceptions, Gadamer (1989,
pp. 273, 374) says, lies the possibility of a “fusion of horizons” in which understanding
shifts and the participants change. It may be that a person visits a National Park in a devel-
oped country with only an economic or aesthetic view of its value but in conversation with
others, encounters views drawn from biology about bio-diversity and the fragility of the
ecosystem. Perhaps they will begin to see the forests in a new light and start to review
their previous beliefs, feelings and actions. It may also be the case that visitors to a pristine
forest site in the developing world need to be made aware of the economic deprivation of
the local inhabitants and that conservation is unlikely to be successful without local support
and hence some sort of economic upliftment program instituted (Boo, 1990). This is
unlikely if views about heritage are simply imposed by a professional interpreter from
the dominant cultural or social group and no active participation or reflection by others
is encouraged.
The professional interpreter, like the visitor, also stands amid cultural tradition and
brings prejudgments to their work. Typically, this is a tradition of conservation and revel-
ation, of which there are many variants. Aldridge (1989, pp. 67–73), after a brief historical
survey of Western philosophy, identified 26 different conservation ideas that continue to
influence conservation practice today. In most contemporary heritage contexts, the interpre-
tive tradition will be informed by science but also by other cultural practices that need to be
articulated. So, rather than suppressing prejudices in interpreting something, Gadamer
advises anyone seeking understanding to make their prejudices explicit and be prepared
to have them examined by others. This requires that the professional interpreter be “reflex-
ive” in explicitly identifying to themselves and their visitors, the tradition(s) in which they
as interpreters and the site (these may not be the same) stand and how values and predis-
positions form part of the interpretation.
Reflexivity about oneself and tradition has implications for the education of pro-
fessional interpreters. It means that in addition to scientific literacy and technical
know-how, interpretive staff need to be aware of the diverse and continuing cultural,
historical, literary and artistic aspects of tradition that feed into wider public’s views of heri-
tage and “sense of place” off-site. This is perhaps most obvious with historical heritage
sites. However, the arts and historical work addressing nature are increasingly popular
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(Sharp, 2005) and this is reflected in the growing academic field of “ecological humanities”
(Rose & Robin, 2004). These arts foster traditions that professional interpreters and inter-
pretive institutions would benefit from engaging with. Those working in National Parks and
forest settings in Australia, for example, would be well served in reading the works of
literary naturalists like George Seddon (1997), Tim Flannery (2002) and Ashley Hay
(2002). Works of fiction relating to particular regions, like Richard Flanagan’s Death
of a River Guide (1994) on Tasmania or Murray Bails’ Eucalyptus (2002) on western
New South Wales, and cinematic works, such as Peter Weir’s Picnic at Hanging Rock
(Mt Diogenes) or Rachel Perkins’ One Night the Moon filmed in the Flinders Ranges in
South Australia, can likewise be instructive for heritage interpreters in those areas. These
works are not science but they enrich the language and tradition through which their
audiences connect with the natural environment and express their concerns. Furthermore,
they give interpreters access to the sorts of popular pre-understandings visitors will bring
with them to particular heritage sites.
It may be that there is not just one cultural tradition encompassing a particular site.
Indigenous cultures, despite the devastation of colonialism, are insistently reclaiming
their voices in many contemporary heritage settings (Dyer, Aberdeen, & Schuler, 2003;
Graham, 1999; Rose, 2000). This raises serious questions for re-negotiating interpretation
and at the very least acknowledging that a number of interpretations “belonging in parallel”
(Read, 2000, p. 223) are possible. Jane James’ (1999) description of interpretative planning
at the former Umeewarra Mission site at Port Augusta in South Australia provides a positive
model of how both Indigenous and non-Indigenous stories might be told without the latter
(a product of the colonizing culture) simply appropriating the former. K. Anne Ketz (2006,
p. 80) drawing upon her experience in a Native American context suggests that optimally, as
a result of a “process of dialogue and collaborative consultation” with sufficient respect,
goodwill and mutual agreement, it may even be possible to produce an “interwoven”
account of multiple voices. An account that is inclusive and does not gloss over the
harsh realities of past or present has much to offer but such an outcome cannot be presumed
in advance of the dialogue.
It is also the case that even in situations where Western cultures are dominant that there
are always competing streams or contested interpretations within the “same” tradition
calling for recognition. This is important for Gadamer because critics such as Apel
(1984) and Habermas (1990) have charged that hermeneutics’ reliance upon tradition
renders it insufficiently critical of the status quo and that any critique must come from else-
where. In response Gadamer (1990, p. 288) argued that “tradition” is not a prisoner to the
past but “exists only in constantly becoming other than it is”; pointing to a dynamic,
self-monitoring and creative notion of tradition. In this view, hermeneutics is a genuinely
“critical perspective” capable of questioning and changing the dominant interpretation of
places and things precisely because traditions already contain within themselves the
moral resources for critique and renewal (Prasad, 2002, p. 23). These resources can be
retrieved and extended through ongoing interpretive and re-interpretive practices. The
philosopher Charles Taylor (1993) supports Gadamer’s view, arguing that any historical
tradition always contains a variety of “internal goods” that have been lost or covered
over. A hermeneutic retrieval, therefore, has the potential to “transcend all our practices
such that we are capable of transforming or even repudiating some practices in the name
of these goods” (Taylor, 1993, p. 355).
An example of hermeneutic retrievals transforming tradition from within can be
found in the interpretive practices of the Ngarinyin people in the Kimberley region of
north-western Australia. In 1987, the Indigenous community of the Kimberley’s with
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some government funding revived the traditional practice of re-painting rock art (albeit with
modern paints) which is central to their interpretation of “country” and the passing on of
this knowledge to future generations (Truscott, 2003). This practice was criticized by
some heritage experts at the time as damaging to the existing images and funding was with-
drawn. However, the interpretation of country continues through an innovative movement
in which Ngarinyin artists have adapted their paintings onto the non-traditional canvass
medium as a way of teaching their young about country and extending their heritage to
new audiences (Roberts, 2005). This latter aspect represents a major shift on the part of
the Ngarinyin elders who condoned the movement because many of the images now
shown in galleries were consideredMamaa or “untouchable” and so traditionally forbidden
to outsiders (EINAR, 2007). Hermeneutics in this broader view is intrinsically bound up
with the ongoing re-telling and critically reflexive interchange of the diverse stories that
shape and reform our identity and heritage.
Gadamer’s stress on the culturally situated, dialogic and critically reflexive character of
interpretation complements contemporary social learning theories in education. Dierking
(1998, pp. 58–61) lists these approaches and cites numerous studies of social interaction
in informal learning settings where dialogical interpretation is apparent. Two major
approaches that have been explicitly linked to hermeneutics are social constructivism
(Hooper-Greenhill, 1999, p. 4) and situated socio-cultural theories of learning (Burbules,
1993; Burbules & Bruce, 2001). Some cognitive psychologists have also embraced ideas
from these approaches. The recent application of such ideas in heritage interpretation,
particularly in museums, is welcome [e.g., Hein (1999) on “constructivism” and Koran,
Willems, and Camp (2000) on “situated cognition”]. However, while these applications
break with the uniform cognitive processing model of interpretation, they also represent
two competing explanations (Packer & Goicoechea, 2000).
Gadamer’s hermeneutics by contrast may help reconcile the contradictory tendencies of
social constructivism and situated socio-cultural perspectives on learning. On the one hand,
Gadamer stresses the active participation, through dialogue and self-reflection, of multiple
participants that is essential to interpretation. In this sense, we do construct meaning with
others and multiple interpretations are possible. On the other, Gadamer insists that the evol-
ving cultural traditions, in which we are socially and linguistically situated, condition and
limit the range of plausible interpretations. In other words, a tree may be simultaneously a
resource to a timber merchant and a sacred site to an Indigenous Australian but it is not a
submarine. There is no viable tradition or interpretive community that will sustain such a
fancy. In this respect Gadamer plots a course for interpretation that avoids the extremes
of both objectivist reductionism and subjectivist relativism.
Attempting to broaden heritage interpretation in the direction suggested by Gadamer’s
hermeneutics would have significant implications. Firstly, as a number of commentators
have suggested (Hooper-Greenhill, 1999; Uzzell, 1998, p. 19), interpretation would have
to be re-conceptualized as a task that belongs equally to visitors as it does to the interpretive
specialist. Interpretive audiences would have to be viewed as the professional interpreter’s
collaborators and dialogue partners. All participants would be seen as potential interpreters.
In this context, providing space for a dialogue between the interpretive guide and diverse
groups of visitors (such as those from various class, gender, age, religious, ethnic and
national backgrounds) is essential in heritage tourist settings.
The second major implication for a hermeneutic approach to heritage interpretation
would be in regard to the role of the professional interpreter. The interpretive guide cannot
and should not attempt to completely control or impose the meanings, which the audience
take away with them. However, they do have a responsibility to take a stand on the
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significance of the site and encourage visitors to reflect on their own relationship to ecologi-
cal or heritage values as an ongoing concern. In order to optimize learning in guided tours, the
official interpreter is indispensable as an informed, resource person and moderator of discus-
sion. In this regard, as Christie and Mason (2003) outline, the interpreter can become a
“critically reflective practitioner” in a process of educational and ethical transformation.
The interpreter or guide after all is best placed to initiate dialogue by raising stimulating ques-
tions, keep the discussion open by encouraging a diversity of views andmoving conversation
forward when participants can only “agree to disagree” (Gadamer, 1989, p. 270). They will
also need the humility to listen carefully and admit the limitations of their knowledge. The
dialogue does not have to cease when the visitor leaves the site. If the visitor is able to take
away interpretive insights, brochures, booklets, invitations to follow-up activities and refer-
ences to other sources, then the conversation continues by other means.
A final word may be added here regarding the changing media and technologies of heri-
tage tourism. Some operators and agencies have shifted from traditional curatorial practices
to “edu-tainment” in their interpretive programs. What is important from a hermeneutic
perspective is not the presence of entertainment per se but whether or not such practices
activate a visitor’s negotiation of the hermeneutic circle. As Veverka (2000) says, the
educational component of heritage tourism is its defining feature but this should never be
sterile or didactic. Gadamer’s (1989, p. 92) work supports this view when he suggests
that “play” has a legitimate role in interpretation because it allows participants to suspend
self-consciousness and imaginatively give themselves over to the activity they may be
involved in. Such involvement, according to Gadamer, has no object other than itself for
the players and yet its estrangement from “the real” can enable learning and change. A
“spectacularly successful” (Sunter, 2003) example of this might be found in the Blood
on the Southern Cross, a computerized sound and light show that the Sovereign Hill
museum employs for the interpretation of the Eureka rebellion of 1854 at Ballarat in
central Victoria. What is decisive, therefore, is not the media but whether such things as
simulations, shows or role playing facilitate a meaningful rather than trivial traversing of
the hermeneutic circle for the heritage visitor.
Conclusion
This article began by noting that despite some emerging signs of diversity, the dominant fra-
mework underpinning much recent heritage interpretation in tourist settings has been drawn
from cognitive psychology. It questioned the limitations of this framework, particularly its
emphasis on universal but individuated cognitive structures and information processing
models of communication for grounding environmental and heritage interpretation. In contrast
to the breadth of Tilden’s vision, the cognitive model appears unnecessarily reductionist and
instrumental. As an alternative, we argued that the relatively neglected paradigm of hermeneu-
tics has the potential to reinvigorate Tilden’s holistic, ethically informed and transformative art
of heritage interpretation, developing it in new directions. In support of this argument we
reviewed the works of four influential hermeneutic philosophers and noted their affinities
with Tilden’s aim and principles. We found that the hermeneutic tradition not only sustains
Tilden’s major claims concerning the nature of interpretation but offers a coherent framework
for furthering heritage interpretation as a broadly inclusive, culturally situated, dialogical and
critically reflexive art. Furthermore, it is an art that encourages bridging the gaps between the
sciences, humanities and popular traditions in heritage interpretation.
In re-visiting Schleiermacher’s work, we found that his guiding principle of explaining
the parts of a phenomenon in terms of a larger whole (explicitly endorsed by Tilden)
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remains central to any interpretive task today. Schleiermacher’s approach also raises for
contemporary professional interpreters the problem of power (i.e., the authority to
make interpretations) in the relationship between interpreters and their audience. This is
something that interpretive planners need to consider if interpretation is to be owned by
its audiences in a democratic and pluralistic society.
In Dilthey, we see that interpretation is always context-dependent and open to exten-
sion. It involves moving between different layers of meaning. Such meaning is not auto-
matically given to sensory perception or common sense. It is only by entering the
“hermeneutic circle” with its ongoing reference between artefact (or site) and context
that our understanding deepens. Hence, Dilthey provides the key to distinguishing interpret-
ation properly from what Tilden would later call “mere information”.
Heidegger points to the fact that interpretation always takes place against a background
of pre-understandings and it is in light of these that we interpret anything we do not under-
stand. Interpretation is not simply a cognitive event. Rather it involves our whole being as it
undergoes a rich variety of experiences within the natural and cultural world. The disclosure
of truth then is not a matter of cognitive correspondence but rather of what Tilden would
call “revelation,” an “un-concealing” of that which is beyond our present purview. The
environmental or heritage interpreter, therefore, is not simply representing the world as it
is but is rather explicating what has been obscured in the light of our shared pre-understand-
ings. Heidegger also reminds us that science is only one amongst a number of important
ways of revealing what is happening in our world. In terms of our continued dwelling
within this world, we cannot rely exclusively upon science for meaning and guidance.
Poetry, narrative and art are perhaps, in many circumstances, more vital ways of provoking
reflection upon our ongoing involvement with natural and cultural heritage.
Gadamer reminds us of the social character of interpretation, due to our reliance
on language, history and others to place us at the point at which we can begin to interpret any-
thing at all. It follows that meaning is not inherent in things themselves or cognitive structures
but rather in cultural traditions. Recognizing the dynamicmediation of such traditions provides a
holistic way of understanding what shapes the heritage tourist experience; giving rise to such
things as a “sense of place”. Interpretation in this view begins by questioning the tradition(s)
in which a heritage artefact or site is situated. It proceeds through dialogue within and
between participants in such traditions. In this process, prejudices are explicated, entertained
(perhaps in a “playful” manner), tested and subject to revision. According to Gadamer, old
meanings are recovered and new meanings emerge, in the interaction between co-interpreters,
their tradition(s) and the thing being interpreted. The recovery of such meanings can also bring
present understandings into question, sometimes radically. This dialogical process fosters critical
reflection and change. However, Gadamer’s situated, dialogical and reflexive theory of interpret-
ation suggests that genuine interpretation can never be manipulated or imposed. It is always in
the process of becoming a process that professional interpreters can facilitate but not force.
This article has gone some way in showing how hermeneutics might contribute to the
ongoing development of interpretation in heritage tourist settings. In particular, it affirms
how heritage interpretation might play a catalytic role or, as Michael Glenn (2006) puts
it, provide a “vital spark” in stimulating visitor’s reflection upon their connections to
place and others. As we have shown, such reflection can be educational, imaginative and
transformative. At its most ambitious, a hermeneutical approach to heritage interpretation
may help facilitate cultural regeneration, an appreciation of diversity and the enactment
of new possibilities for social and ecological sustainability.
In short, hermeneutic perspectives have much to offer the conceptualization, planning
and practice of heritage interpretation as an inclusive, critical and dialogical endeavour.
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If embraced, these approaches would also have significant implications for the evaluation of
interpretation. The discussion of these implications, however, requires another article. All
that can be said here is that hermeneutics points towards participatory forms of resource
management and action research. What this article has sought to do is more basic. It is
clearing a path for re-conceptualizing the processes involved in heritage interpretation,
particularly the decisive interplay between visitors and culture. In exposing problematic
assumptions in past work and proposing a hermeneutic alternative, the case for a
broader, polysemic interpretation of interpretation in heritage tourist settings is clear.
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